Does Valid Reasoning Matter?
(Colloquium on argumentation)
Many philosophers, no doubt, value deductively valid reasoning. But why is that the case? Answers diverge. According to the first one, it is because disputes can be resolved by good arguments, and often by valid ones. We can persuade opponents that the disputed statement is true (or false) by valid reasoning. The second answer finds valid reasoning valuable because it extends our knowledge. By deducing consequences previously not seen, we expand what we know. The third answer sees the value of valid reasoning in providing good reasons for (or against) the argued statement. By valid reasoning we justify the statement as true (or false). The fourth answer states that all the former answers fail either on the paradox of inference, or on the regress problem, or on the problem of begging the question. Yet, it values valid reasoning as a tool of criticism. But does criticism avoid all the difficulties of the former answers? If it does not, can the difficulties be somehow resolved? If not, does valid reasoning matter at all? The colloquium aims to answer at least some of these questions.
September 13–16, 2018
John Biro (University of Florida); Marie Duží (VŠB – Technical University of Ostrava); Jan Albert van Laar (Univeristy of Groningen); David Miller (University of Warwick); Jaroslav Peregrin (Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)
Tomáš Čana (University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava); Gábor Forrai (Eötvös Loránd University Budapest); Danny Frederick (Independent Scholar); Karel Šebela (Palacký University Olomouc); Gábor Zemplén (Budapest University of Technology and Economics).
Department of Philosophy, Matej Bel University, Banská Bystrica, Slovakia
Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia
(The colloquium is organized with the financial support from Vega 1/0617/17.)
Miloš Taliga (Matej Bel University)